My Review of “The Eastern Question” in New York Journal of Books (October 27, 2015)

October 27, 2015

Hi All —

Not posting much lately – busy with teaching a class at our local Armstrong State University, serving on the Board of the Uweza Foundation, and an occasional book review for the New York Journal of Books; the most recent of which is of “The Eastern Question” by Ted Danforth published today, October 27, 2015.

The book is an attempt to explain long-standing political tensions leading to 9/11. Mr. Danforth  sees a direct linear connection between “the Huns, Goths, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, Russians . . . and now Jihadi.” According to Mr. Danforth, each of those geopolitical actors have, in their turn, posed direct threats to the “West.” Indeed, “for the West, the East has always been a question: It’s where trouble comes from.” Hence “The Eastern Question.”

If you would like to read my entire review of that book, please click here “The Eastern Question”


My Review of New Biography — William Egan Colby and the CIA

April 9, 2013

William Egan Colby was the highly visible Director of Central Intelligence during 1973–1975 following a career in the CIA beginning in its predecessor OSS during WWII; the Agency’s head of clandestine efforts in Sweden and Italy during the 1950s; Deputy Chief  and then Chief of Station in South Viet Nam (1959–1962); Chief of its Far East Division (1962–1967), and again in Saigon as deputy, and then civilian head of the American counter-insurgency program within Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1968 to 1971.

My review of the new biography — Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA — written by Randall Woods was published by the New York Journal of Books on June 6, 2013. Although not without a few minor flaws, this book should be read by anyone interested in either political biographies and/or the recent history of America’s foreign policy.


January 10, 2011

Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose (“the more things change, the more they remains the same”).                                                  Alphonse Karr (1808-1890)

Although a system may cease to exist in the legal sense or as a structure of power, its values (or anti-values), its philosophy, its teachings remain in us. They rule our thinking, our conduct, our attitude to others. The situation is a demonic paradox: we have toppled the system but we still carry its genes.                              Ryszard Kapuscinski (1932-2007)

Understanding the historical roots of basic concepts commonly used in international development assistance efforts is important because the social, economic, and political context within which they were formulated continues to affect the way we look at such things today. However, links between the many assumptions, values and institutions existing during the latter years of the colonial period and current development efforts are not often acknowledged1 and even less often understood.

This blog post is the first of three intended to identify and discuss a few of those links. It focuses on the post-World War I colonial period, including the period following World War II. The second and third posts will expand this discussion to cover the immediate post-colonial period of the 1960s and 1970s as well as provide more depth regarding how those links have affected current views of international development objectives and methods.

Assumptions & Concepts

Below I take a look at four key concepts: “sovereign-states,” “development,” “welfare,” and “reconstruction.” The first two terms “development;” and “welfare” reach back to policies and practices current before the Second World War — even as their meaning has evolved. The distinction between “reconstruction” and “development” was embedded in the name first given to the World Bank in 1944 – i.e., the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – while the organizing legal principle of the “sovereign-state,” on which the entire structure of official development assistance is based, goes back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.


Almost all official development assistance moves from, to, and through sovereign-state governments or multi-lateral sovereign-state membership organizations like United Nations’ agencies, The World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The legal recognition of that sovereign-state system 362 years ago confirmed a uniquely European process of both nation and state building already underway for several centuries. But socio-economic groups targeted for development assistance in Africa, Asia and some areas of Latin America and the Middle East have not had that same historical experience. Instead, the introduction of the sovereign-state structure during the colonial period was both foreign and abrupt.

Indeed, sovereignty contrasts sharply with pre-colonial patterns of authority in those non-European areas where political authority was attributed to emperors or other monarchs and was not based in formal legal agreements that established clearly demarcated borders within which a Monarch was recognized by other monarchs as having complete and ultimate legal authority.2 Instead, indigenous authority in many of those areas was based primarily on: (1) a chief, monarch, or other leader’s ability to enforce it; (2) mutually beneficial trading relationships among leaders or people engage in commerce; and/or (3) reinforcing culturally defined relationships.3 The European notion that a monarch was vested with independent sovereign authority within specifically geographically demarcated borders was foreign in the most fundamental sense of that term when extended to non-European areas. And that “foreigness” was compounded by the colonial variant whereby the exercise of legal authority within colonies was reserved to officials of sovereign European governments located far away. It is instructive that when we talk about the post-colonial era we refer to the transition from colonies to independent states, not independent people. As a consequence, the sovereign-state system has taken deeper root in some places than in others, resulting in ineffective and illegitimate development programs and policies in many of those countries. 

The belief that sovereign-state governments alone govern is the foundational assumption on which the entire institutional architecture for delivering official development assistance has been built. The consequences of that assumption have only recently been recognized: (i) boundaries of sovereign-states that do not often correspond to the requirements of true nation-states; (ii) development projects and programs designed and organized for sovereign-state “citizens” rather than social, economic, and political affinity groups; and (iii) fundamental disconnects between non-formal parallel governance systems and officially recognized states and governments.

Development & Welfare

Today development is most often viewed as the reduction of both income and non-income poverty – the process through which fewer and fewer people live on less than $1 or $2 a day and/or do not have affordable access to formal education and effective health services. But that has not always been the case.  Britain’s Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1939 viewed “development” as improvement of infrastructure required for efficient extraction of raw materials.  By contrast, the term “welfare” applied to the provision of improved health, education, housing, and urban wages in the “colonies,” “protectorates” or “mandated” or “trust territories” (hereinafter synonymously “colonies” or “dependencies”).  While development was directed toward enhancing the economies of the colonial powers, welfare was directed toward elimination or reduction of labor strikes, protests, and rebellions.4 


In 1944, European and Asian landscapes were littered with wreckage over which the United States stood as a largely unscathed colossus.  The USA’s gross national income (GNI) equalled 216.7 percent of France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the USSR combined; the USSR and the UK respectively owed the equivalent of $136.5 billion and $384.7 billion in current 2010 currency values; other British Commonwealth countries, China, and France had borrowed the equivalent of another $99.3 billion, and another fifty-two countries owed $49.6 billion received from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). All that debt was owed to the United States and the American Government alone held the overwhelming majority of the world’s monetary gold stocks. As a result, European currencies had lost almost all of their international value. The immediate problem for the USA, UK and France was how to continue providing large cash transfers from the Americans to its European allies while simultaneously reducing European debt. 

Until the establishment of France’s Ministry for Cooperation in 1961, the USA was the only bi-lateral “foreign aid donor.” Between 1946 and the end of 1952, the United States provided economic assistance worldwide worth approximately $231.5 billion today; of which forty-three percent went to Europe (including France as the largest borrower and Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom).5 By contrast, World Bank lending to Europe between 1946 and 1952 was the equivalent of only $5.1 billion.6 The Bank’s first four loans were made during 1947 to France, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Luxembourg7 while its first “post-reconstruction” (i.e., “development”) loan was approved in 1948 for the purchase of reconverted warships by four Dutch shipping companies.8 By the end of the colonial era (1970), the Bank had extended loans to seventeen European countries; twenty-one percent of which was specifically for investments in eighteen Belgian, French, and UK colonial territories.9

Values & Assumptions

The focus on European reconstruction was a function of both the distribution of power and unexamined assumptions, experience, and persistent values. For Westerners without significant experience in colonial territories or newly independent countries, the projection of their own values onto unknown people should not be surprising. Westerners with actual experience among “native” peoples often explicitly rejected the non-European beliefs and values of “those” people. A communiqué sent by John Maynard Keynes to the UK Treasury during preparation for the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference convened to establish the World Bank and IMF reflects such attitudes:

Twenty-one countries have been invited which clearly have nothing to contribute and will merely encumber the ground, namely, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Luxembourg. The most monstrous monkey-house assembled for years. To these might be added: Egypt, Chile and (in present circumstances) Yugo-slavia [sic].10

Various comments by delegates to the United Nations’ Trusteeship Council between 1947 and 1951 reinforce the notion that “development” was viewed as a process directed toward bringing “a Western mode of reasoning” to the people of the colonies;11 as do the references to “less highly developed regions,” “young and immature nations” or “old but underdeveloped nations.”12Nations” in that context were clearly understood to be synonymous with “states” while subsequent formulations – “newly industrializing,” “newly emerging,”  “third world,” “fourth world,” and so forth – reinforced the notion that development was essentially the same as the economic growth of sovereign-states. 

It is also important to note that America’s experience during the Great Depression prior to World War II combined with John Maynard Keynes earlier criticisms the Treaty of Versailles ending World War I13 were much in evidence when the form and functions of the World Bank and IMF were agreed at Bretton Woods. The World Bank was to lend long-term investment capital to sovereign-state governments and the IMF was to regulate currency exchange-rates and provide short-term loans to countries not able to meet occasional foreign exchange deficits. More generally, there was a prevailing belief that scientific approaches to complex planning, management, and technological issues would overcome whatever obstacles might arise. That optimism prevailed in large part because of broadly shared beliefs, values, and desires among Americans and European allies alike. At the same time, intellectual inertia appears to have carried the pre-War distinction between “development” and “welfare” forward into the post-War period. 

Colonial Development 

While European countries were themselves a major constituency of the USA and World Bank from the mid-1940s through the end of the 1950s, those same economies were also closely interwoven with their respective colonies and dependencies. The United Kingdom and France provide examples of an almost seamless organizational and staffing transition from colonial administration to direct bi-lateral international development assistance. 

United Kingdom.  Fifty-four of the United Nations’ 192 current sovereign-state members (28%) have been British colonies or protectorates at one time or another. With the exception of India from 1858 and Burma from 1937, responsibility for staffing, managing, and financing the development of British colonies was assigned to the Colonial Office.14 Although in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the new Labour Government was officially anti-colonial, it was nevertheless faced with the need to alleviate severe shortages of food, fuel, and natural resources at home. Reflecting fears current during November 1947, the UK’s Minister for Economic Affairs Sir Stafford Cripps believed that…  

the whole future of the sterling group and its ability to survive depends in my view upon a quick and extensive development of our African resources,

even as Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin argued that –

If only we pushed on and developed [our colonies in] Africa, we could have [the] United States dependent on us, and eating out of our hand in four or five years.15

Britain’s Cabinet Secretary summarized the apparent contradictions between the Government’s public rhetoric and actual actions in a report to the Prime Minister in 1948:

At recent meetings there has been general support for the view that the development of Africa’s economic resources should be pushed forward rapidly in order to support the political and economic position of the United Kingdom…. [The policy] could, I suppose, be said to fall within the ordinary definition of “Imperialism.” And, at the level of a political broadcast it might be represented as a policy of exploiting native peoples in order to support the standards of living of the workers in this country. This policy is doubtless inevitable – there are compelling reasons…. But if it is disclosed incautiously or incidentally, without proper justification and explanation, may it not be something of a shock to Government supporters – and indeed, to enlightened public opinion generally?It can, of course, be argued that the more rapid development of Africa’s resources will bring social and economic advantages to the native peoples in addition to buttressing the political and economic influence of the United Kingdom.16

Therefore, in 1948 Government established a Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) in parallel with the continuing responsibilities of the Colonial Office.  The CDC was tasked with achieving more rapid development in the colonies by: (i) fostering integration of the heretofore separate physical infrastructure (“development”) and assistance for human health, education, and domestic food production (“welfare”) arenas and (ii) mobilizing private investment to meet the increased costs that such integration was thought to require.17 From that point on, the term “welfare” has been implicitly subsumed within the concept of “development.”

France.  Twenty-four sovereign-state members of the United Nations (13%) are former French colonies. France’s transition from colonial authority to provider of bi-lateral finance followed a path similar to the UK’s. French colonial officials had also begun to argue for substantially increased Government funding to meet both development and welfare objectives during the 1930s. In 1945, the Government established the Economic and Social Investment Fund for the Overseas Territories (FIDES); followed the next year by inclusion of all overseas Departments, colonies, and self-governing “Associate States” within the “French Union.” That arrangement effectively replaced the formerly separate colonial administrative service. FIDES continued with responsibility for planning and financing investments, but the administrative responsibilities of the former colonial service were distributed among other ministries and agencies of the French Government.

World Bank.  By 1949, IBRD managers and staff concluded that its comparative advantage was in “development” rather than “reconstruction.” By 1960, at least fifty-two percent of its cumulative lending was for development purposes; nineteen percent of which was for investments in colonial territories.18 During the period 1953-1961, India and Japan alone received twenty-seven percent of total World Bank lending (16% and 11% respectively), South Africa received thirty-one percent of lending to Sub-Saharan Africa, and twenty percent of total lending was directed toward Latin America. The UK borrowed a total of $265 million for agriculture, energy, “land settlement,” and transport in nine colonies between 1952 and 1963.19 However, it never did borrow from IBRD for investments in its own home islands, relying instead on financing by the USA directly for that purpose.  

Lending for investments in colonial areas was anticipated in IBRD’s Articles of Agreement; i.e.

to members whose metropolitan territories have suffered great devastation from enemy occupation or hostilities… [and] shall pay special regard to lightening the financial burden and expediting the completion of restoration and reconstruction…. [while] not interfer[ing] in the political affairs of any membernor…[be] influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned.

Colonies were not members of the Bank while four “metropolitan” powers – Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and UK — were members and, along with the USA, held sixty-two percent of voting shares within IBRD in 1947.20 In the event, ten percent of IBRD’s total 1947-60 lending commitments were allocated to project investments in European colonial territories in Africa.21

Loans for colonial “development” were attractive during the 1950s for at least two reasons: (1) outside of Latin America and the Middle East, infrastructure development project opportunities were largely limited to colonial Africa and (2) European colonial officials were most able to prepare investment plans to technical standards required by the Bank. Nonetheless, such lending also meant that European governments would benefit from those loans.  As an example, the first of those loans (to Belgium) in 1951 consisted of two component parts: (1) $40 million to the Belgian Congo Development Authority primarily for development of transport infrastructure and (2) $30 million directly to the Central Bank of Belgium to defray the indirect costs of Belgium’s own colonial expenditures.22 

The issue of World Bank lending for investments in “Dependent Overseas Territories” was raised again during discussions leading up to the establishment of the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) in 1960. The United Kingdom and France argued that “territories” should be eligible for IDA’s concessional finance while many of the Bank’s senior managers and advisors were opposed. The tenor of those discussions is best captured by notations in various internal memoranda by four American and two British members of the World Bank’s Loan Committee during the period 1959-1960; as follows –

Peter Cargill (UK):23      If the United Kingdom wanted to step up development in [its] colonies it could afford to do so…. 

Eugene Black (USA):        [IDA loans to colonies would result in] siphoning major portions of [its] subscriptions back to the metropolitan countries….

J. Burke Knapp (USA):           Lending by IDA to colonial territories was a very dubious proposition. The Committee expected…not to have IDA pick up the white man’s historical burden [note the use of colonial language here even by those opposed to financing  in colonial territories]. Were there not cases in which countries were sufficiently established as wards of the United States to be treated paramountly as colonies[?] If IDA financed African wards of France and the United Kingdom, it might just as well finance wards of the United States….

S. Raymond Cope (UK):           [Indeed, that should be the case with respect to such] wards of the United States, [as for example] Korea. 

Eugene Black (USA):                IDA would only be able to invest in Korea and Viet-Nam on a token basis….

Davidson Sommers (USA):     It would be helpful to the Bank and to these countries occasionally to have relations with the Bank instead of having them all with the U.S…..

Richard Demuth (USA):         Korea and China [Taiwan] should be eligible if a good project came along, butkeep the amount low.24

The ultimate decision was that both colonies and “less-developed member countries” would be eligible for IDA borrowing. Nonetheless, that decision was ultimately made moot by the rapid pace of decolonization and, therefore, no projects were actually ever financed by IDA in colonial territories.

The early post-war period had at least four lasting consequences for the structure of development assistance today. First, the creation of the United States’ Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to manage Marshall Plan assistance in 1949 provided a model for subsequent bi-lateral agencies established by other countries. Second, the initial seeds of subsequent European integration were planted through the establishment of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) as the counterpart to ECA. Third, the penchant for long-term planning was presaged by the ECA’s requirement that European recipients prepare detailed plans specifying how its financing would be used. Finally, and most importantly for our purposes here, western beliefs, values, and desires were institutionalized within the world-wide development system.

The key conceptual and structural links between the post-World War I colonial period and the decade or two following World War II provide the historical foundation for the discussion of the post-colonial period that followed. As discussed further in the next two posts of this three part series, the meaning of “development” has evolved over time. Nonetheless, both in terms of formulation and pursuit, it is clearly rooted and driven by Western notions of progress and European-centered experience.  __________________________________


  [1]   Although William Easterly’s book The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2007) implies a focus on the link between colonial policies toward “development” and contemporary efforts, his narrative does not discuss the roots of specific “development” concepts and attitudes in the period under review in this series of three Blog posts. Instead, that book focuses instead on the deficiencies of expert-driven planning approaches to development at the expense of indigenous knowledge and priorities.

  [2]   James Brierly, The Law of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1928). 

  [3]    Jerry Mark Silverman, Historic National Rivalries and Contemporary Inter-State Conflict in Mainland Southeast Asia in M. Zacher and R. S. Milne (eds), Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1978), p. 45-78.

  [4]    Ronald Chilcote (ed.), The Political Economy of Imperialism (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2000) and Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

  [5]    Truman Library, (1993) Oral History Interview with August Maffry conducted by Richard McKinzie, Oral History Project (January 19, 1993) available at

  [6]    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Eighth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1952-1953 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1953) available at

  [7]    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Second Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1946-1947, Ended June 30, 1947.

  [8]    World Bank, World Bank Group Historical Chronology: 1944-1949 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1949) available at

  [9]    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Eighteenth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1962-1963 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1963) available at and World Bank, World Bank International Development Association Annual Report 1970 (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 1970) available at

[10]    Quoted in Elizabeth Johnson and Donald Moggridge (eds), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Volume 26, Activities 1943-46: Shaping the Post-war World: Bretton Woods and Reparation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 42; incorrectly quoted in Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 62.

[11]    Pierre de Senarclens, How The United Nations Promotes Development Through Technical Assistance in Majid Rahnema with Victoria Bawtree (eds), The Post-Development Reader (London: Zed Books, 1997), p. 190-206.

[12]    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Second Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1946-1947, Ended June 30, 1947 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1947) available at

[13]    See John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920).

 [14]  United Kingdom, Government of, Maps and Plans: Overseas Relations Overseas Records Information 6 (London, UK: The National Archives, 2003) available at

[15]    Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

[16]    Mike Cowan, Early Years of the Colonial Development Corporation: British State Enterprise Overseas during Late Colonialism, African Affairs, 82 (1984), p. 67-68 as quoted in Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 96.

[17]   Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). 

[18]   International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Eleventh Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1955-1956 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1956) available at; Twelfth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1956-1957 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1957) available at; Thirteenth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1957-1958 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1958) available at; and Fourteenth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1958-1959 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1959) available at

[19]   International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Seventeenth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1961-1962 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1962) available at

[20]   International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Second Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1946-1947, Ended June 30, 1947.

[21]   International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Eleventh Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1955-1956; Twelfth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1956-1957 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1957); Thirteenth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1957-1958; and Fourteenth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1958-1959 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1959).

[22]   Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). 

[23]    Peter Cargill (UK) had, prior to joining the staff of IBRD during its early years, been an increasingly senior member of the UK’s colonial India Office. Eugene Black (USA) had served as a senior vice president of Chase National Bank since 1933 prior to being appointed as IBRD’s United States’ Executive Director in 1947 and IBRD’s third President in 1949; serving in that position until 1962. J. Burke Knapp (USA) had served as an Economist at the United States Federal Reserve Board (1940-44) and in several post-World War II positions related to international economic relations prior to joining IBRD in 1952 and eventually serving from 1956 as one of its three Vice-Presidents. S. Raymond Cope (UK) had spent most of his life in commercial banking prior to joining IBRD’s Loan Department at the end of 1947 and serving as Assistant Director of Operations for Europe, Africa, and Australasia beginning in 1952 and Director of Operations, Europe, Africa, and Australasia from June 1955. Davidson Sommers (USA) had served as an Assistant to the Secretary of War John McCloy in the Pentagon prior to joining IBRD as a lawyer in the law department in 1949 and as Vice President and General Counsel from 1956 to 1959. Richard Demuth (USA) was a lawyer in private practice and then during World War II within the United States Government prior to joining IBRD during 1947 as an Assistant to the first President of IBRD Eugene Meyer (USA) before serving as Director of its Department of Technical Assistance and Liaison from 1951 and Director of the Development Services Department and the International Relations Department from 1961 until 1973.

 [24]   Quoted in Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), as paraphrased and re-sequenced by Jerry Mark Silverman.

Keywords: Bretton Woods Conference, Burma, Chile, Colonial Office, Colonialism, colonies, Columbia, Costa Rica, development, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, fourth world, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, IDA, IMF, India, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, International Monetary Fund, international relations, Iran, Iraq, John Maynard Keynes, Liberia, Luxembourg, Marshall Plan, newly emerging, newly industrializing, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Parallel Governance, Peru, Philippines, protectorates, reconstruction, sovereign-state, third world, trust territories, underdeveloped country, United Kingdom, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), United Nations, Uruguay, Venezuela, welfare, World Bank, Yugoslavia.

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